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MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT: AN
OVERVIEW AND COMPARISON WITH UCC
COVERAGE, DISCLAIMER, AND REMEDIES IN
CONSUMER WARRANTIES
By KURT A. STRASSER*

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act addresses the warranty problems of the consumer in the market
place.' Recent discussions of consumer problems with warranties have focused on three areas. First, the length and complexity of a typical con-2
sumer product warranty makes it too confusing for the average consumer.
This is particularly true in light of the consumer's ignorance of the existence of implied warranties. Second, the "warranty," which is expressly
made to the consumer, customarily disclaims all implied warranties under
the Uniform Commercial Code and, consequently, takes away a great deal
more than it gives. 3 Third, a consumer warranty is frequently difficult or
impossible to enforce, particularly against a recalcitrant seller., The
amount involved is seldom sufficient to justify the pursuit of legal remedies
and the consumer usually feels that no other effective remedies are available.
The problem is made more severe by the growth of the use of consumer
products, the growth in the amount of spending for them, and the ex* Assistant Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Vanderbilt University (B.A., 1969; J.D., 1972).
1. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§2301-2312 (Supp. 1975) (hereinafter cited as the Act). This citation refers only
to Title I of the Act, the only part of the Act dealing with warranty problems. For a discussion
of the Federal Trade Commission improvements and enforcement powers contained in Title
H of the Act, see Note, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 831 (1975); Kintner and Smith, The Emergence of
the Federal Trade Commission as a FormidableConsumer ProtectionAgency, 26 MERCER L.
REV. 651 (1975).
2. Clark and Davis, Beefing up Product Warranties: A New Dimension in Consumer
Protection, 23 KANSAS L. REV. 567, 570 (1975); Leete, A Look at the Consumer Warranty
Problem - The Federal Solution, 6 TOLEDO L. REV. 351 (1975). This problem was also
identified in the House of Representative's Report on the House version of the Act, House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7702 (1974) (hereinafter cited as House Committee
Report).
3. Clark and Davis, supra note 2, at 575-77; Leete, supra note 2, at 352; House Committee
Report, supra note 2, at 7711. "Thus, the present misleading practice of using very limited
express warranties to reduce consumer rights which would have been available but for the
disclaimer of implied warranties is prohibited by title I." Senate Committee on Commerce,
S.Rep. No. 93-151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Senate Committee
Report).
4. Leete, supra note 2, at 353. Clark and Davis, supra note 2, at 577-83, after a study of
the cases, conclude that consumer warranties are enforced by the courts in favor of those
consumers who are persistent enough to pursue their rights through the trial courts and at
the appellate level.
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panded use of the warranty as a competitive sales device.' As a result, the
consumer feels misled, or even cheated when confronted with warranty
problems which arise from the purchase of almost everything he buys. In
addition, the consumer's weak bargaining position prevents him from bargaining for more meaningful warranty protection, even if he desires to do
SO.

6

On January 4, 1975, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1975 [hereinafter the Act] was signed
into law, becoming effective six months from that date.7 It applies to goods
manufactured after the effective date. The Act, as passed, contained provisions that were essentially similar to bills passed by the Senate in two
previous Congresses, neither of which had been passed by the House. The
legislative history indicates a continuing desire on the part of the Senate
to provide some relief for the consumer problems addressed by this bill.,
The Act authorizes and requires the Federal Trade Commission to make
rules in the areas of disclosure, pre-sale availability of warranties and
dispute settlement mechanisms on or before January 4, 1976.1 As discussed
below, proposed rules were issued on July 15, 1975 and final rules were
issued on December 31, 1975.
This article will first present an overview of the Act and the rules which
5. House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7705; Clark and Davis, supra note 2, at 56769.
6. The consumer's situation was accurately stated by Senator Kennedy in the Senate
debates on a predecessor to the Senate version of this bill:
It is only when the item breaks down or does not work properly from the start that
the purchaser carefully reads the fine print, assuming that he kept the certificate
or container, only to discover that the particular defect is not covered by the warranty, or that he must pay service and handling charges to get it repaired or
adjusted, or that at best he must pay for returning the item to some distant factory
where months may ensue before the manufacturer is ever heard from again.
Remarks by Senator Kennedy on S.986, Cong., Sess., 111 CONG. REC. 39817 (1971).
7. 15 U.S.C.A. §2312(a) (Supp. 1975). Rules promulgated pursuant to the title are to take
effect six months after the final publication of the rules unless the Federal Trade Commission
postpones their applicability until one year from such final publication. 15 U.S.C.A. §2312(b)
(Supp. 1975).
8. Problems with consumer warranties have been studied at least since the middle of the
1960's; for a history of these studies, Federal Trade Commission Reports, and Presidential
task forces, see House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7707-11. The first bill introduced
was S. 3074, introduced in the Senate in 1969 and passed that same session; the bill was
reintroduced as S. 986 in the 92nd Congress and again passed the Senate, but again did not
receive House action. The bill was reintroduced as S. 356 in the 93rd Congress and passed
the Senate in that form. See Senate Committee Report, supra note 3, at 4-6; Senate Debate
on S.356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) 119 CONG. REc. 29472 et seq. (1973). See also Senate
Debates, supra note 6, for consideration and passage of S. 986. The companion House bill to
S. 356 was H.R. 7917. See the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of the Conference, CONF. REP. No. 93-1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
7756 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Conference Report) for a discussion of the Conference Committee's solution to the differences between the bills.
9. 15 U.S.C.A. §2312(c) (Supp. 1975).
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have been promulgated pursuant to it followed by a comparison of the
provisions of the Act with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) dealing with coverage, disclaimer, and remedies in consumer warranties. The UCC comparison will focus primarily on specific code sections
and individual cases will be cited only where they substantially change
application of the UCC. The three rules adopted December 31, 1975 will
also be discussed. 0
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE AcT AND RULES

The Act was passed in response to the specific consumer problems discussed above and to the generalized feeling of consumer helplessness in the
face of warrantors' practice of using existing state law to effectively deny
the consumer redress under consumer warranties. The Act was passed to
make warranties more understandable to the consumer and to insure that
obligations arising under either express or implied warranties are enforceable." As stated in the House Committee Report, the Act is designed to
solve consumer warranties problems by:
1. [R]equiring that the terms and conditions of written warranties on
consumer products be clearly and conspicuously stated in simple and
readily understood language,
2. [P]rohibiting the proliferation of classes of warranties on consumer
products and requiring that such warranties be either a full or limited
warranty with the requirements of a full warranty clearly stated,
3. [S]afeguards against the disclaimer or modification of the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness on consumer products where a
written warranty is given with respect thereto, and
4. [Pjroviding consumers with access to reasonable and effective reme12
dies where there is a breach of a warranty on consumer products.
10. The FTC has stated that it "considers rulemaking under §101(12) regarding depreciation for purposes of refunds under the Act a priority matter" and consideration is also being
given to rulemaking concerning: advertising, labeling and point of sale disclosure of information, exemptions from the statutory options of designation, disclosure of the terms and conditions of service contracts, rules to extend terms of warranties where consumers are deprived
of the product for an excessive period of time while it is being serviced, the three reasonableness standards in sections 104(a) and (b), exceptions to the section 104(b)(2) requirements
concerning liens and encumbrances on consumer products, detailed information of warrantor's duties under section 104(a) and warranty provisions for incorporation by reference into
warranties. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Implementation and Enforcement Policy, 719
ATRR D-3 (BNA 1975). One bill has been introduced to give special remedies to buyers of
new cars, H.R. 10302, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), 743 ATRR A-i (BNA 1975). This article
will not discuss that amendment. It is also anticipated that the FTC will issue a new enforcement policy in the near future.
11. House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7702; Senate Debate on S. 356, supra note
8, at 29480.
12. House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7711; Senate Debate on S. 986, supra note
6, at 39818.
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The Senate consideration of the matter added consumer need for greater
product reliability. This need would be met, it was thought, by making it
economically rewarding for a manufacturer to build in better quality.
Under the present system, to achieve a competitive price, a manufacturer
must make products as cheaply as possible and then must disclaim all
warranties possible. The Act rewards those manufacturers who make the
more reliable products by giving them the competitive sales advantage of
a "full" warranty. 3 By making warranties more understandable, the Act
will permit the consumer to make an informed choice between products
on the basis of their warranties and will make consumer warranties a more
important factor in the competition for sales. Thus, the legislation is an
attempt to change the "rules of the warranty game:"
Only when the rules of the warranty game are clarified so that the consumer can look to the warranty duration of the guaranteed product as an
indicator of product reliability (because all costs of breakdown have been
internalized) will consumers be able to differentiate on the basis of price
between more reliable and less reliable products. This ability to differentiate should produce economic rewards from increased sales and reduce
service costs to the producer of more reliable products.
Only a warrantor giving this type of 'full' warranty is in a position to
increase his profit, by making product reliability or service capability
improvements. Furthermore, to the extent that consumer choice in the
market place is guided by the desire for product reliability measured by
the duration of the warranty, there will be an incentive for suppliers of
consumer products to offer full warranties of relatively long duration.
are
Therefore, there is a need to identify for the consumer which products
4
fully warranted and to create standards for 'full' warranties.1
The Act also is designed to help the consumer by strengthening the
enforcement powers of the Federal Trade Commission which is the consumer's primary protector in the market place. This aspect of the Act is
dealt with in Title Two and is beyond the scope of this discussion."
A.

Disclosure

The heart of the Act is its disclosure provisions which are designed to
make consumer warranties more understandable and to make manufacturers truly competitive in the warranties which they provide." Section 102,
13. Senate Committee Report, supra note 3, at 8; Senate Debate on S. 356, supra note 8,
at 29480, 29489 (remarks of Senators Moss and Dole). Product reliability was also mentioned,
although not stressed, in House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7706.
14. Senate Committee Report, supra note 3, at 8. Of course, this benefit of the Act will
be achieved only to the extent that consumers perceive the differences between warranties
and make choices motivated by those differences.
15. See authorities cited, supra note 1.
16. Clark and Davis supra note 2, at 607-08; House Committee Report, supra note 2, at
7718.

1976]

MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT

1115

the first disclosure section, requires that a warrantor "fully and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily understood language the terms and
conditions of [a subsection (a)] warranty." 7 The precise disclosure rules
are to be promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission but the Act
furnishes guidance by specifying a number of items which may be included
in those disclosure rules. As finally adopted, the rules of the Commission
require disclosure of the following general categories of information:
(1) the identity of the party or parties to whom the warranty is
extended and any limitation on the parties who may enforce the
warranty;
(2) a description of the products, parts, or characteristics covered
by the warranty;
(3) a statement of what the warrantor will do if there is a defect,
malfunction, or failure to perform in accordance with the written
warranty;
(4) the time when the warranty commences;
(5) an explanation of the procedure which the consumer should
follow to obtain performance of the warranty obligations:
(6) information concerning an informal dispute settlement mechanism;
(7) any permissible limitation on the duration of implied warranties, including specified statements which must be included;
(8) any exclusion of or limitation on relief, including limitations
on incidental or consequential damages; and
(9) a prescribed statement that the warranty gives specific legal
rights and that the consumer may have other legal rights which
vary from state to state.'"
Such disclosure is required in the purchase of any consumer product
which costs $15.00 or more; this $15.00 limit is a change from the $5.00
coverage provision which was originally stated in this section of the statute.'9 The statute provides that section 102 (as well as sections 103 and 104)
"shall not apply to statements or representations which are similar to
expressions of general policy concerning customer satisfaction and which
are not subject to any special limitation."' 0The rules extend this limitation
to such statements made
17. 15 U.S.C.A. §2302(a) (Supp. 1975).
18. 16 C.F.R. §701.3 (1975).
19. Compare 15 U.S.C.A. §2302(e) (Supp. 1975) with 16 C.F.R. §701.3(a) (1975). Because
the language of the statute only excludes certain consumer products (those costing less than
$5.00) and does not require coverage of any particular product, it seems permissible for the
FTC to exclude additional products (those costing from $5.00 to $15.00). It is questionable
whether this exclusion is contrary to the intent of the statute.
20. 15 U.S.C.A. §2303(b) (Supp. 1975). The House Committee Report indicates that this
provision could apply to statements such as "satisfaction guaranteed or your money back."
House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7719.

1116

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

on emblems, seals or insignias issued by third parties promising replacement or refunds if a consumer product is defective, [and] which
statements contain no representation or assurance of the quality or performance characteristics of the product, [if the disclosures set forth
above] are published by such third parties in each issue of a publication
with a general circulation [and] provided free of charge to any customer
on request.'
The apparent purpose of this exception is to permit guarantors such as
Good Housekeeping to continue their operations, at least in a modified
form. An amendment (known as the "Good Housekeeping" Amendment)
which would have changed the definition of warrantor to accomplish this
result, was proposed and rejected on the House floor at the time the Act
was passed. 2 The sentiment expressed by the bills' sponsors in opposition
to the amendment was that this is a voluntarily given warranty and that
it should be subjected to the same rules as every other warranty. In view
of this history, one must seriously question whether even this limited exception made in the rules is proper.
The final disclosure rules do omit three disclosure requirements which
were contained in the original proposed rules. First, the proposed rules
required disclosure of all duties required of a purchaser; the FTC determined that this information was fully addressed by requirements 3 and 5
of the final rule and was, for that reason, redundant. 3 Second, the proposed rules required a disclosure of the limitation on time of day or days
of the week when warranty work could be performed. The FTC felt that
this provision was simply unworkable because of the large number of service facilities which a substantial warrantor will have, the fact that service
facilities vary and that several different printed warranties would be required, and finally, that most warrantors would comply by adopting a very
restrictive statement that listed only those hours that the warrantor could
be certain every service facility would be open.2" Third, the proposed rules
required that when a "life" or "lifetime" warranty is offered, the warranty
must disclose what "life" is being referred to. The Commission felt that
this information must be disclosed under other sections and specifically
21. 16 C.F.R. 701.3(b) (1975). This provision was not contained in the rules as originally
proposed.
22. House consideration of H.R. 7917, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), 120 CONG. REC. 940003 (daily ed. September 19, 1974). Of course, such promises are still subject to section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act and section 110 of this Act. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Implementation and Enforcement Policy, 719 ATRR D-3 (BNA 1975).
23. Proposed rules, §701.3(g), 40 Fed. Reg. 29892 (July 16, 1975) (hereinafter cited as
Proposed Rules); Federal Trade Commission Statement, 40 Fed. Reg. 60181 (December 31,
1975) (hereinafter cited as FTC statement).
24. Proposed rules, §701.3(j), supra note 23, at 29893; FTC statement, supra note 23, at
60181. The Senate Committee Report on this Act states that such information is necessary
for consumers to be able to make intelligent product selections. Senate Committee Report,
supra note 3, at 15-16.

MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT

19761

1117

noted that the entire matter would still be subject to its jurisdiction under
section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act.2"
B.

Pre-Sale Availability Of Warranty Terms

In addition to requiring disclosure, the Act directs the FTC to promulgate rules concerning the availability of the terms of a written warranty to
a consumer prior to the sale and further requires that the information be
"clearly and conspicuously presented or displayed so as not to mislead the
reasonable average consumer." 2 The final rule adopted by the Commission
concerning pre-sale availability of terms requires that a warrantor either
clearly and conspicuously display the text of the warranty "in close conjunction to each warranted product," or maintain a notebook available to
the consumer which contains copies of the warranties.27 In addition, the
seller must not remove the warranty prior to sale and the seller must
provide all warranty materials required by the Act. These requirements are
clearly necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act.
C. Designation Of Warranties
In order to accomplish the disclosure envisioned by the Act, and to
encourage a minimum standard of warranty protection and performance,
the Act requires that every written warranty be designated as either "limited" or "full.

28

A predecessor of the present act, passed by the Senate but

never enacted by the House, called for labeling of warranties as "full" or
"partial" rather than full or limited. This terminology was opposed on the
ground that "there would be denigrating consequences associated with the
phrase 'partial.' "2 The theory behind the designation is that competitive
pressure will force many, if not most, merchants to use a "full" warranty.
Where a "full" warranty is given, the manufacturer is required to comply
with the minimum federal standards set forth in section 104 of the Act.'"
25. Proposed rules, §701.3(m), supra note 23, at 29893; FTC statement, supra note 23, at
60181.
26. 15 U.S.C.A.*§2302(b)(1) (Supp. 1975).
27. 16 C.F.R. 702.3(a)(1) (1975). The proposed rule had required a binder for every warrantor. Following the hearings, written comments submitted during the rulemaking proceedings convinced the FTC that this procedure was simply unworkable in view of the large
number of warranties and great variety of kinds of products and sales techniques used. The
proposed rule also required display of the warranty on the "primary display panel," a term
taken from the Fair Products Labeling Act. This provision was omitted from the final rules.
28. 15 U.S.C.A. §2303(a) (Supp. 1975). The Commission is given power to waive this
requirement by rule. 15 U.S.C.A. §2303(c) (Supp. 1975).
29. See Senate debate on S. 3074, a predecessor of S. 356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., (1970),
116 CONG. REc. 22473 (1970). The Senate bill as passed contains three categories of designation, rather than the two finally enacted. This was omitted in conference. Conference Report,
supra note 8, at 7756.
30. 15 U.S.C.A. §2304(a) (Supp. 1975). In the only advisory opinion issued to date under
the Act, the FTC required a warrantor giving a "full" warranty of an installed product to
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These standards essentially require that a manufacturer: (1) remedy a
defective consumer product, (2) not impose any limitation on the duration
of any implied warranty, (3) not exclude or limit consequential damages
unless that limitation conspicuously appears on the face of the warranty,
and (4) permit the customer to collect a refund or replacement without
charge if the defect is not corrected after a reasonable number of attempts.
The section further regulates warrantors in providing that they shall not
impose any duty other than notification on the consumer unless the warrantor has demonstrated that the duty is reasonable; in addition, the warrantor must remedy the defect "without charge." 3 ' The warrantor may
protect himself by requiring the consumer product to be made available
to him free and clear of liens and encumbrances and by stipulating that
he will not be liable if the failure of the consumer product is caused by
damage resulting from unreasonable use of the product." Thus, to the
extent that competitive pressures do in fact force warrantors to offer a
"full" warranty on their products, the Act establishes a new standard for
the content of consumer warranties-a standard which is much higher
than the presently prevailing practice.
A warranty not designated as "full" must be designated as "limited."
However, even in this situation a warrantor is not completely free of all
restrictions. Presumably, if a document is labeled a "warranty," it must
provide some effective remedy for the consumer and the Act implies that
any so-called warranty which does not do so would be in conflict with the
spirit of the Act, thereby being a violation of section five of the Federal
Trade Commission Act as well. 31 In addition, any limited warranty is subject to three requirements under the Act: (1) the disclosure requirements
of section 102 as discussed above; (2) the remedies provision of section 110
include an obligation to provide installation of replacement materials without charge. Armstrong Cork Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1975) 21,052 at 20,896 (FTC Advisory Opinion, Dec.
1, 1975).
31. "Without charge" means that the warrantor cannot assess a consumer for any costs
incurred in connection with the required remedy. 15 U.S.C.A. §2304(b)(1) and §2304(d)
(Supp. 1965).
32. 15 U.S.C.A. §2304(b)(2) and §2304(c) (Supp. 1975). As discussed below, the Act
covers consumer products which become "fixtures" by being attached to realty. If the consumer is required to pay off the mortgage on his home or other real estate before securing
warranty performance, the Act places a very unreasonable burden on him. Clark and Davis,
supra note 2, at 610. The legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend this
provision to apply to mortgages or other liens or encumbrances on real estate. Senate Committee Report, supra note 3, at 13. The preferable solution in this case is to require that the
secured party or other lienholder accept a security interest or other encumbrance on the
repaired or substitute product.
33. Leete, supra note 2, at 374. The broad definition of "written warranty" in section
101(6) of the Act, in conjunction with the broad prohibition of deceptive acts in section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, support the conclusion that a document labeled as a
warranty which provides no effective remedy would be very questionable. It would also
probably be misleading. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(c)(2) (Supp. 1975).
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of the Act, discussed below, including the new provisions on consequential
damages for personal injury; and (3) the limitations on implied warranties.
Beyond these requirements, a limited warranty can contain any provisions
the warrantor desires as long as they are clearly and conspicuously disclosed and made comprehensible.
D. Disclaimer Of Implied Warranties
The disclosure and designation provisions of the Act apply only to written warranties, as defined in the Act. However, the Act goes on to substantially limit disclaimers of implied warranties and the remedies available
in section 108.11 As pointed out in the floor debates on the bill, implied
warranties are "what reasonable men would expect to believe the results
of the purchase and sale of items in the marketplace would imply."135 The
purpose of section 108(a) is stated in the House and Senate Reports on the
bill:
This subsection is designed to eliminate the practice of giving an express
warranty while simultaneously disclaiming implied warranties. This practice has often had the effect of limiting the rights of3 the consumer rather
than expanding them as he might be led to believe.
Thus, the purpose of the section was not to create new implied warranties
but simply to enforce those warranties already existing under state law.
To accomplish these purposes, section 108 changes existing state law and
provides that no supplier may disclaim or modify an implied warranty if
he makes a written warranty or gives a service contract with respect to
products sold. It does permit a written warranty to be limited to a reasonable duration "if such limitation is conscionable and is set forth in clear and
unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of the warranty. '37 This provision is clearly in conflict with section 2-316 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and will prevail over it and any other contradictory state laws which do not afford the consumer greater rights.3 Thus,
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with disclaimer
of warranties are clearly modified insofar as they apply to consumer war34. 15 U.S.C.A. §2308 (Supp. 1975).
35. Senate debate on S.356, supra note 8, 119 CONG. REc. at 29480-81 (remarks of Senator
Moss).
36. Senate Committee Report, supra note 3, at 21. A nearly identical statement is contained in the House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7722.
37. 15 U.S.C.A. §2308(b) (Supp. 1975) contains the limitation quoted; §2308(a) contains
the prohibition on disclaimer.
38. 15 U.S.C.A. §2311(c)(1) (Supp. 1975) provides that state requirements relating to
labeling or disclosure which are not identical to the provision of §§2302, 2303, and 2304 will
not be applicable to written warranties. As discussed in the legislative history presented
above, the limitation on disclaimer of implied warranties is a fundamental purpose of this
bill and Congress clearly intended it to prevail over contrary state laws. For this reason,
section 108 of the Act will be supreme.
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ranties. For most states, this is a substantial change in the law and several
jurisdictions have already adopted amendments to the UCC which change
the law with respect to implied warranty disclaimer. 9 To the extent that
those state laws grant to consumers greater remedies than the Act grants,
those state laws will control.4 0
E.

Other Provisions

Several other specific provisions of the Act must be considered here
briefly. Section 110 of the Act, the remedies section, provides for a mandatory (but not binding) dispute settlement mechanism if the requirements
of the Act and the rules are followed." These provisions give a warrantor
the opportunity to avoid litigation if acceptable settlements can be
achieved. In addition, the dispute settlement mechanism gives the warrantor a means of defusing a potential class action and thus avoiding substantial litigation. The remedies provision of the Act also provides for a federal
cause of action for breach of state implied warranties, as well as for breach
of the express written warranty regulated by the Act.4" (The remedies
provision will be discussed below in section IV.)
The Act broadens the definition of "consumer" to include any person to
whom the product is transferred during the term of an implied or written
warranty and any other person covered under applicable state law. 43 The
Act defines a remedy to mean repair, replacement, or refund.44 It further
provides that consumer products may have both full and limited warranties if the warranties are clearly and conspicuously differentiated.4 5 It covers service contracts as well as warranties," permits designation of representatives by the warrantor to perform duties under written and implied
warranties, and specifies where the ultimate responsibility for those duties
will rest.4" The Act also requires that the FTC initiate rulemaking proceedings concerning used cars within one year after January 4, 1975.11
39. 15 U.S.C.A. §2311(b) (Supp. 1975) does provide that this Act shall not "invalidate or
restrict any right or remedy of any consumer under State law or any other Federal law." For
a discussion of the state laws which have either amended the relevant UCC provisions or
enacted separate statutes, see Clark and Davis, supra note 2, at 584-605; Leete, supra note
2, at 375-78.
40. 15 U.S.C.A. §2311(b) (Supp. 1975). A recent study of the case law in this area indicates that most courts will find a way to avoid application of a disclaimer of implied warranties in a consumer situation if the consumer will pursue his remedies through trial to the
appellate levels. Clark and Davis, supra note 2, at 577-84.
41. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310 (Supp. 1975); 16 C.F.R. §703 (1975).
42. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(d) (Supp. 1975).
43. 15 U.S.C.A. §2301(3) (Supp. 1975). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-318.
44. 15 U.S.C.A. §2301(10) (Supp. 1975).
45. 15 U.S.C.A. §2305 (Supp. 1975).
46. 15 U.S.C.A. §2306 (Supp. 1975).
47. 15 U.S.C.A. §2307 (Supp. 1975).
48. 15 U.S.C.A. §2309(b) (Supp. 1975).

19761

MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT

1121

Although more specific provisions of the Act will be dealt with in the
remainder of this article, one can see from the above overview that the Act
is a substantial change in the law governing consumer warranties. When
combined with the broadened powers of the Federal Trade Commission for
enforcement and rulemaking provided in Title II, the potential of the FTC
for assuming a greatly expanded role in the consumer warranty area is
vast.
II.

COVERAGE

The Act is designed to modify and supplement provisions of the UCC
and other relevant state laws where those provisions are applicable to
consumer warranties. The Act can achieve these purposes only to the extent that its coverage is either identical to or broader than that of the UCC.
In dealing with coverage, it should be noted that one is talking about two
distinct questions: (1) what products are within the definition of the substantive regulations of the statute, and (2) what warranties or potential
warranties are within the coverage of the statute? The coverage provisions
of the UCC and the Act will first be generally reviewed. Next, this section
will apply those provisions to determine the coverages of various warranties that may arise in a given hypothetical fact situation, and in variations
of that situation.
The UCC applies only to "transactions in goods" and, by their terms,
the relevant warranty sections apply only to sales transactions." The UCC
definition of goods focuses on things "which are movable at the time of
identification to the contract for sale." ' The UCC provides that an express
warranty is created by an affirmation of fact or promise "which relates to
the goods," and which becomes "a part of the basis of the bargain."' It
further provides, however, that while there need not be a specific intention
to make a warranty, a statement merely of the value of the goods or of the
seller's opinion or commendation of the goods will not create a warranty.
In addition to the provisions on express warranties, the UCC provides for
the creation of two kinds of implied warranties. First, if the seller is a
merchant, there is an implied warranty that the goods are to be merchantable.52 The essential requirement of the definition of merchantability is
that the goods will be fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are
49. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-102. See §§2-313 through 2-316 for the warranties provisions of the Code.
50. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-105(1). Section 2-107 discusses the treatment of things
to be severed from realty.

51.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-313. This section also provides that warranties may be

created by descriptions of the goods or by samples or models, if those descriptions become
part of the basis of the bargain. For purposes of this article, the term warranty means
warranty of quality only. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-312 covers warranties of title, which
will not be discussed in this paper.
52. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-314.
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normally used. Second, the UCC provides that an implied warranty that
the goods will be fit for a particular purpose arises when three requirements
are met: (1) the seller has reason to know of the buyer's particular purpose
for which the goods are to be used, (2) the seller has reason to know that
the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment in selecting or furnishing the goods, and (3) the buyer does in fact so rely.13 As will be discussed
below, the UCC also provides that warranties may be modified or disclaimed. 4 Under the UCC, any party in the sales or distribution chain can
become a warrantor. Indeed, it is quite likely that the retail seller will
create implied warranties, and may create express warranties as well. The
UCC provides that a warranty may be enforced by any natural person in
the family or household of the buyer; however, this section has been subject to local modifications and three alternatives are now proposed with the
official draft.5
The Act applies to consumer products as defined. The definition focuses
on tangible personal property which is "normally used for personal, family
or household purposes. ,56 The legislative history clearly indicates that the
Act is intended to apply to the seller of used items as well as new items,
where a written warranty is offered. 7 It is also clear that the Act is to apply
to consumer products which are attached to realty, even if those products
eventually become "fixtures" for purposes of state law. 8 A much more
53.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§2-315. The requirement of actual reliance by the buyer

is implicit in the section, see comment 1 section 2-315.
54. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-316.

55.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§2-318, Alternative A. Alternatives B and C drop the

requirement that the third party beneficiary of a warranty be in the family or household of
the buyer and require only that such a person "reasonably be expected to use, consume or
be affected by the goods" and that they be injured by the breach of warranty. The reason for
the change, as stated by the draftsmen, is that "[tihere appears to be no national consensus
of the scope of what warranty protection is proper, but the promulgation of alternatives may
prevent further proliferation of separate variations in state after state." Comment 3 provides
that the section is not intended to restrict the class of potential plaintiffs under a warranty
and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law in this area.
Beyond this brief summary, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the UCC coverage
and warranties. See J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE chs. 9 and .10
(West, 1972); NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES §§20-22 and ch. 4 (West, 1970); Clark and Davis,
supra note 2, at 572-75; Leete, supra note 2, at 353-60.
56. 15 U.S.C.A. §2301(1) (Supp. 1975). The Act does not cover seed for planting, 15
U.S.C.A. §2311(a)(2) (Supp. 1975).
57. Conference Report to S. 356 at 29, H. R. REP. No. 93-1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974);
House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7717; Senate Debate on S. 356, supra note 8, 119
CONG. REC. at 29487 (remarks of Mr. Cotton).
58. The Act expressly states that a consumer product includes property "intended to be
attached to or installed in any real property without regard to whether it is so attached or
installed." 15 U.S.C.A. §2301(1) (Supp. 1975). See House Committee Report, supra note 2,
at 7717; Senate Committee Report, supra note 3, at 11. This is also the interpretation which
the FTC has given the Act, FTC Implementation and Enforcement Policy, 719 ATRR at
D- 1.
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difficult problem is presented by the consumer product which is used for
business purposes. The language of the Act focuses on the "normal use"
and would appear to cover products which are used by a business if their
normal use is for consumer purposes. The legislative history is contradictory, however. The House Committee Report states:
There are many products which fall within this definition which are also
used for other than personal, family, or household purposes. . . .Such
items are consumer products for purposes of this legislation. 9
The Senate Committee Report, on the other hand, states:
To the extent there is any necessary ambiguity in the term "consumer
product," the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of coverage .. .Of
course, the Federal Trade Commission could exempt a warrantor from the
disclosure and labeling provisions of the bill to the extent that he sells
consumer products to persons for use in their businesses . . .The definition of consumer is not intended to include persons who utilize consumer
products for commercial purposes.60
In the final rules, the FTC has excluded "products which are purchased
only for commercial or industrial use. ....,1from both the disclosure
rules and the rules concerning presale availability of terms. Thus, at least
for purposes of these sections of the Act, a product purchased for business
use will not be a "consumer product" even if it is normally used by consumers.
The Act goes on to specify that it applies to written warranties only. A
written warranty is defined as a written affirmation of fact or written
promise "made in connection with the sale of a consumer product . . .
which relates to the nature" of the product; the definition also covers a
written undertaking to refund, repair or replace the product."2 Such affirmations or undertakings become written warranties only if they are part
of the basis of the bargain between the parties. The basis of the bargain
test here is presumably the same as that under the UCC. While the Act
does require that the affirmation or undertaking be in "connection with"
the sale as well as "relate to the goods," the UCC has only the second of
these requirements. 63 Although it is nominally an additional requirement,
it does not appear likely that many cases will arise where there are affirmations which "relate to the goods" which are not also "in connection with"
the sale, where the basis of the bargain requirement is also fulfilled. An
59. House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7717.
60. Senate Committee Reports, supra note 3, at 11-12.
61. 16 C.F.R. §§701.1(b) and 702.1(b) (1975). However, such goods are not excluded from
the operation of an informal dispute mechanism. 16 C.F.R. §703.1(b) (1975).
62. 15 U.S.C.A. §2301(6) (Supp. 1975). The Act does not apply to warranties given to a
buyer who buys for purposes of resale.

63.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§2-313.
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express warranty created by description or model will be covered by section
2-313 of the UCC, but would not be covered by the Act. An implied warranty is defined in the Act as one which arises by operation of state law64
and these will quite likely be warranties which arise under sections 2-314
and 2-315 of the UCC.
A warrantor is defined in the Act as a person who either gives a written
warranty or who may be obligated under an implied warranty. 5 As discussed below, the retailer who sells directly to a consumer typically will
be liable under the UCC implied warranties. While these warranties may
be enforced under section 110(d) of the Act, a written warranty may be
enforced only against the warrantor giving it, 6 and, thus, separate claims
will be necessary. Unlike the Act, the rules adopted under the Act define
"warrantor" to include only the person who gives or offers to give a written
warranty. 7 The written warranty is typically made by the manufacturer
and, under the Act, it can be enforced only against the manufacturer.
Because the Act provides that it is not to be construed as restricting existing consumer warranties, presumably these warranties can still be enforced
under the UCC but not under the Act.
Through its definition of "consumer," the Act appears to broaden the
class of persons who will be entitled to enforce the provisions of the warranty. The Act defines consumer to include not only the original buyer, but
also any person to whom the product is transferred during the duration of
an implied or written warranty. 9 The Act goes on to provide that such a
consumer may bring suit for damages or other legal or equitable relief,
subject to the provisions of the Act on informal dispute settlement procedures and class actions.70 Thus the Act extends to subsequent purchasers
the right to enforce the warranty. However, the Act and the rules do permit
a warrantor to limit or exclude any obligation under the warranty to subsequent purchasers, thus permitting a warrantor to effectively negate this
provision.7 ' Of course, persons permitted to enforce the warranty under the
provisions of section 2-318 of the UCC or other state laws will still have
the right to do so in a cause of action under the UCC or those laws.
The operative provisions of the Act cover only goods which cost at least
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

15 U.S.C.A. §2301(7) (Supp. 1975).
15 U.S.C.A. §2301(5) (Supp. 1975).
15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(f) (Supp. 1975).
16 C.F.R. §§701.1(g), 702.1(d), 703.1(d) (1975).
Leete, supra note 2, at 367.
15 U.S.C.A. §2301(3) (Supp. 1975). Earlier drafts of the Act had limited "consumer"

to "any person to whom such a product is transferred for use for person, family or household
purposes." S. 356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §101(3) (1973). Because this provision was deleted in
the final version, one can infer that the use limit was not intended to apply to a subsequent
purchaser. Clark and Davis, supra note 2, at 607, n. 256.
70. 15 U.S.C.A. §§2310(a)(3), 2310(d) (Supp. 1975). This is clearly the position taken by
the final rules adopted by the FTC. . 16 C.F.R. §§701.1(h), 703.1(g) (1975).
71. 15 U.S.C.A. §2302(a)(2); 16 C.F.R. §701.3(a)(1) (1975 Supp.).
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the minimum amount." Unfortunately, the different provisions have different dollar minimums and the final rules have changed some of these
dollar amounts. The disclosure provisions are stated in the Act to apply
to consumer products costing more than $5.00,13 whereas the final rules
change this to $15.00." The designation of warranty section applies only
to consumer products costing more than $10.00 which are not covered by
"full" warranties. 5 The provision on disclaimer of implied warranty and
the remedies provision have no specific dollar limit." Thus, the question
of which section of the Act applies will depend upon the cost of the product.
A.

Coverage In A Typical Consumer Goods Sale

Coverage of both the Act and the UCC can be most easily understood
by analyzing what warranties arise and what statute controls in a typical
consumer goods sale. (The typical case will then be varied to expand specific coverage problems.) In what is a typical case, Manufacturer makes
and sells a one cubic foot refrigerator, which is intended primarily for home
use by consumers and is in fact normally used in that way. Manufacturer
nationally advertises the product as being of high quality and free of defects in material and workmanship. At the point of sale to the consumer,
Manufacturer gives a warranty which promises repair, replacement, or
refund, at Manufacturer's option, for a period of one year from the date of
purchase and Manufacturer distributes this product through local retailers
who sell directly to consumers. In this case, we will assume that Consumer
has purchased the refrigerator from Retailer, that Consumer was given a
copy of Manufacturer's written warranty at the time of purchase, and that
this written warranty became part of the basis of the bargain. In addition,
we will assume that Retailer made oral representations concerning the
quality and suitability of a refrigerator for Consumer and that these oral
representations were part of the basis of the bargain.
The Act will apply to the written warranty made by Manufacturer. It is
an affirmation of fact in connection with the sale of the consumer product
which relates to the nature of the goods and it is also an undertaking in
writing to refund, repair, or replace; furthermore, both of these have become part of the basis of the bargain." Thus, Manufacturer will be re72. House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7718 indicates that "actually costing $5 or
more" means cost of the goods, exclusive of any applicable tax.
73. 15 U.S.C.A. §2302(e) (Supp. 1975).
74. 16 C.F.R. §7013(a) (1975).
75. 15 U.S.C.A. §2303(d) (Supp. 1975).
76. 15 U.S.C.A. §§2308 and 2310 (Supp. 1975). Of course, there will be dollar limitations
and other limits for federal court jurisdiction of the remedies in both individual and class
suits. This will be discussed below.
77. 15 U.S.C.A. §2301(6) (Supp. 1975). It has been assumed that the warranty became
part of the basis of the bargain. This is an assumption that will not be justified in all cases.
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quired to comply with the provisions of the Act. The UCC also will apply
to this written express warranty, to the extent that its absence would
"restrict any right or remedy of any consumer . . . ."I' A state may not
enforce any law that deals with labeling or disclosure if the requirements
of that law are inconsistent with sections 102, 103, and 104 of the Act."9 As
discussed above, the Act will apply only if this warranty is made in connection with the sale and relates to the nature of the material or workmanship.
The UCC requires only that the affirmation "relate to the goods." It does
not appear that these different standards will be relevant to coverage of
the written warranty.
In this transaction there are also express oral warranties which arise
under the provisions of section 2-313 of the UCC. Here, the statements by
Retailer will probably give rise to such a warranty, assuming that such
statements constitute an affirmation of fact which relates to the goods and
which becomes part of the basis of the bargain. 0 This express nonwritten
warranty will not be covered under the Act, and any enforcement of it will
have to be pursuant to the UCC. Thus, the remedies available under the
Act would not be used to enforce such an oral nonwritten warranty."' It is
also possible that the advertising of either the manufacturer or the retailer
may give rise to an express nonwritten warranty.82 Such advertising, even
if in writing, is probably not "in connection with" the sale and, for this
reason, will probably not be covered by the Act. If it is not in writing, the
Act will not cover it as a written warranty. The problem under the UCC
will be to determine whether the advertising was part of the basis of the
bargain between the parties; if so, it will be covered by the UCC and
enforceable under it. As can be seen from the above, the express, nonwritten warranties typically given by Retailer will not be enforceable under the
Act although the express written warranty of the Manufacturer will be
covered. In addition, a warranty given by Retailer cannot be enforced
against Manufacturer under the Act, even though it may be so enforceable
3
under the UCC.1
78. 15 U.S.C.A. §2311(b)(1) (Supp. 1975). See generally Leete, supra note 2, at 370-71.
79. 15 U.S.C.A. §2311(c)(1) (Supp. 1975). Such state laws may be enforced if the FTC
determines that they afford greater protection to the consumer than the Act and that they
do not unduly burden interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C.A. §2311(c)(2) (Supp. 1975); Senate
Committee Reports, supra note 3, at 25.
80. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-313(1)(a). Where a product is simply stated to be
"guaranteed," the content of such a warranty may appropriately be determined by the content of the warranty of merchantability. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-314, Comment 4.
81. The Senate version of this Act originally extended its remedies provisions to the
breach of an oral express warranty. This revision was taken out in the Conference Committee.
Conference Committee Report, supra note 8, at 7758; Senate Committee Report, supra note
3, at 24.
82. The UCC comments provide that an affirmation of fact which meets the UCC requirements will normally be presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §2-313, Comment 3. This presumption does not appear to be appropriate where the
affirmation of fact is made in advertising.
83. Leete, supra note 2, at 367.
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In this typical fact situation, implied warranties will be created by the
UCC and will be enforceable against Manufacturer under the Act. An
implied warranty of merchantability exists in any sale of goods by a merchant.84 A merchant, with respect to certain goods under the UCC, is one
who either deals in goods of that kind, holds himself out as having knowledge or skill about the goods of that kind, or one to whom the buyer can
attribute such knowledge and skill by virtue of the merchant's agent.8 5 This
will certainly cover the typical seller of consumer goods, and will probably
cover his manufacturer, so each will have made an implied warranty of
merchantability. It is not difficult to imagine facts under which the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose will arise here. In our fact
situation, if Consumer is diabetic and wishes to use the small refrigerator
to store insulin, this would have quite likely been communicated to Retailer. If Retailer knew of this use, i.e., knew the buyer was relying on him
to select a suitable refrigerator, and the buyer did so rely, there would be
an implied warranty of fitness for this particular purpose." This implied
warranty is usually made by Retailer but not by Manufacturer.
Thus, in our typical consumer sale, the written warranty will be enforceable only against Manufacturer. The implied warranty of merchantability
will be enforceable against both Retailer and Manufacturer. If an implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises, it will probably be made
by Retailer and, as discussed immediately below and elsewhere, Retailer
will be permitted to disclaim these implied warranties, effectively negating
the consumer's remedy from him.
B.

Written Warranty By Retailer

For this example, it is necessary to make one modification in the typical
fact situation presented above. Here Retailer gives his own written warranty, in addition to the oral representation he made above. In this situation, the written warranties of both Manufacturer and Retailer will be
covered by the Act, as that coverage was discussed above. Coverage of
express nonwritten warranties of Retailer, and Manufacturer, if any, will
remain the same.
In this situation, the real difference arises with enforcement of the implied warranties discussed above. The Act provides that implied warranties may not be disclaimed or modified if Retailer "makes any written
84.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

85.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§2-314.
§2-104. Comment 2 states that the qualification in §2-314
"restricts the implied warranty to a much smaller group than everyone who is engaged in
business and requires a professional status as to particular kinds of goods." See generally J.
WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-6 (West, 1972).
86. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-315.
87. As discussed below, there will be prohibitions on disclaimer or implied warranties
which will be applicable to the manufacturer but not the retailer.
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warranty to the consumer with respect to such consumer product. ...."

In the typical case presented above, this restricts disclaimer of implied
warranties by Manufacturer but not by Retailer. In this modification,
Retailer will be subject to the same limitation on his disclaimer of implied
warranties that Manufacturer is subject to under the Act. Thus, Retailer
is placed under substantially greater restrictions if he makes a written
warranty. The sophisticated retailer will avoid making a written warranty
in order to avoid these limitations. This anomolous result is caused by the
Act's adoption of the UCC implied warranties without extending the coverage, for implied warranty purposes, to all UCC warrantors. It clearly discourages Retailer from making written warranties.
C. Sale Of Consumer Goods Which Become "Fixtures"
Problems also arise when the typical fact pattern is modified by the
refrigerator being built-in or otherwise attached to the realty in such a
fashion that it becomes a fixture." In this situation, the Act applies even
though the consumer goods are now real estate as a matter of state law."0
Whether the UCC will apply depends on the nature of the particular fixture. In defining goods, the UCC avoids the use of the word "fixtures." The
comments state that things attached to realty are covered by the UCC if
they are "capable of severance without material harm thereto."' Often,
fixtures are such an integral part of the realty that this requirement cannot
be met, and the UCC will not apply. Where the consumer purchases goods
which become fixtures, there will typically be no regulation of express
nonwritten warranties. To the extent that the UCC does not apply, there
will be no UCC remedy for express nonwritten warranties. As discussed
above, the Act does not cover these warranties.
In addition, and more seriously, there will be no UCC implied warranty.
The Act does not create implied warranties and only seeks to enforce
implied warranties created by state law. Because the UCC does not apply,
88. 15 U.S.C.A. §2308(a) (Supp. 1975). § 2308(b) does permit the duration of implied
warranties to be limited to a reasonable period if such limitation is conscionable. Where the
retailer has not given a written warranty, he could disclaim implied warranties with a statement that qualified as a disclaimer under the relevant provisions of the UCC but did not
create an express warranty under section 2-313. Such a form might provide that "this product
is sold without any express warranty, oral or written." See Clark and Davis, supra note 2, at
595.
89. "Fixture" here is used in its usual sense to mean a chattel which has become real
property by being attached to the land with the requisite intent. See C. SMITH AND R. BOYER,
SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 222 (2d ed. 1971); Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
90. 15 U.S.C.A. §2301(1) (Supp. 1975). For a discussion of the only FTC Advisory Opinion
to date which deals with obligations to repair remedy "installed goods," see Armstrong Cork
Co., supra note 30.
91. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-105, Comment 1. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§2-107.
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state law implied warranties will usually not be created and the Act will
have no implied warranties to protect. Thus, unless there are other state
law warranties created outside the UCC,11 or unless the UCC is applied by
analogy as a matter of state law, 3 the Act will not regulate disclaimer of
implied warranties in this situation. There is no indication in the legislative history of the Act that the draftsman intended to provide less warranty
protection for goods which become fixtures than for other goods. To the
extent that it reaches this result, the Act is not well drafted. This result is
caused, as with the problems above, by the Act's adoption of the UCC
definition of implied warranties without also adopting its coverage. In this
respect, the Act would be materially improved if it defined its own implied
warranties.
D.

Sale Of Consumer Goods For A Business Use

Other difficulties arise when the typical fact situation is varied by assuming that the refrigerator is sold to a laboratory which uses it to refrigerate chemicals for test samples. Because the refrigerator is normally used
as a consumer product, the Act applies by its own terms.' The FTC is
authorized to exempt such products as this from the disclosure and pre5
sale availability requirement of the Act, and it has done so in this case.
However, some provisions of the Act will still be applicable; specifically
the Act's requirement that warranty terms be "fully and conspicuously"
disclosed "in simple and readily understood language." 9 The limitations
92. For a discussion of other state law warranties created either outside the UCC or
through modifications to it, see Clark and Davis, supra note 2, at 584-605; Leete, supra note
2, at 359. Courts have increasingly avoided the doctrines of caveat emptor and merger to find
a warranty of habitability in the sale of a residence by a builder-vendor. See generally S.

7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §926(a) (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1963); Murray, Under the
Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHA L. REv. 447
(1971); Comment, Development in Actions for Breach of Implied Warrantiesof Habitability
in the Sale of New Houses, 10 TULSA L.J. 445 (1975). For a discussion of warranties of
habitability under lease agreements, see Comment, Landlord-Tenant Law Reform-Implied
Warranty of Habitability:Effects and Effectiveness of Remedies for Its Breach, 5 TEXAS TECH

WILLISTON,

L. Rxv. 749 (1974).

93. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 92. Certainly, the Code does not prohibit such extension
by analogy:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purposes to warranties made
by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this
Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which
have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to
the direct parties of such a contract.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-313, Comment 2.

94.
95.
96.

15 U.S.C.A. §§2301(1), and 2301(3) (Supp. 1975).
15 U.S.C.A. §2302(e) (Supp. 1975).
15 U.S.C.A. §2302(a) (Supp. 1975). While this section does authorize the Commission

to make disclosure rules, the requirements quoted in the text apparently are not made subject
to those rules. In view of the conflicting legislative history, it is difficult to solve this interpre-
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of the Act on disclaimer or modification of implied warranty will still be
applicable, as those limitations govern any "implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such consumer products."97 The remedies provisions
of the Act will continue to apply as well.
The UCC does not distinguish between consumer and nonconsumer
goods and so its coverage of express non-written warranties and implied
warranties remains the same. To the extent that other state laws or modifications of the UCC do make such a distinction, it will be necessary to see
whether the particular statute in question covers consumer goods sold for
a nonconsumer use.
E.

Lease of Consumer Goods

Where consumer goods are leased rather than sold, the Act does not
apply. Similarly, by their terms the UCC warranties apply only to sales of
goods." This will be true for written express warranties, nonwritten express
warranties, and implied warranties. Some jurisdictions have extended the
UCC to lease transactions by analogy.9 To the extent that the jurisdiction
in question has done so, the UCC provisions would still be applicable even
though the Act would not. Although consumer leasing of consumer goods
is less prevalant than business leasing of business goods, it does occur.
Presumably, the Act does not cover leases of consumer goods because its
primary focus is on the manufacturer who gives the written warranty
rather than on the retailer. However, from a consumer's point of view, the
Act preserves the anomalous result of the UCC in extending its protections
to a sale of consumer goods but not extending them to a lease of consumer
goods.
F.

Sale of Nonconsumer Goods

In this situation, the Act will not apply and the provisions of the UCC
will control. This will be true for written express warranties, nonwritten
express warranties, and the implied warranties in sections 2-314 and 2-315.
This is certainly in keeping with the purposes of the Act which are to afford
additional warranty protection and remedies only to consumers purchasing
consumer goods.
tation problem. The broad scope of permissible rulemaking causes one to question the statement made in the text of the statute.
97. 15 U.S.C.A. §2308(a) (Supp. 1975). Of course, those limitations only apply to a supplier who makes a written warranty.
98. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§2-313 through -315.
99. see authorities cited supra, note 92. The Act does cover sales of a service contract. 15
U.S.C.A. §2306 (Supp. 1975).
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Coverage Summary

Coverage of the Act is similar to the coverage of the UCC and this is
usually sufficient; however, where the retailer gives a written warranty and
where consumer goods which become fixtures are sold, some problems
develop. These problems are caused by the failure of the Act to create its
own implied warranties and its resulting reliance on state law (UCC) implied warranties. Because the rules adopted alter the definition of consumer product and consumer, some difficulties arise in the coverage of the
sale of consumer goods to a business. Presumably as a policy choice, the
Act does not extend its warranty protections to a lease of goods. To the
extent that it relies on state law implied warranties, the Act cannot provide
effective implied warranty coverage of leases except in those states which
have extended such warranties by analogy to the UCC.
The remainder of this article will assume that the Act applies unless the
context clearly indicates otherwise. The article will now explore the operation of the Act in light of and as effected by relevant UCC provisions.
1II.

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES

For purposes of this discussion, a disclaimer is defined to be words or
conduct of any person liable under a warranty which attempt to accomplish any one of three objectives: (1) complete negation of any implied or
express warranty; (2) withdrawal of substantive rights of the consumer
purchaser arising under an express or implied warranty (including the
right to enforce the warranty for a specific period of time); and (3) placement of substantial procedural obligations on the consumer buyer as a
condition of enforcement of his remedy. This section will deal with two
questions that arise under the subject of disclaimer. First, how may disclaimer be accomplished, assuming that it is permissible? Second, what
may be disclaimed? In treating the latter question, only the general categories of obligations which cannot be disclaimed will be discussed. Incidental
or consequential damages disclaimer will be treated as a remedies problem
in the following section. This section will treat disclaimer problems of
written warranties and then discuss those of implied warranties.
A.

Written Warranties

The Act is designed to require a warrantor to disclose the terms of his
written warranty. It is not intended to prohibit disclaimer of a written
warranty or, except in a case of a "full" warranty, to require that any
particular standard of warranty protection be afforded under a written
warranty. For this reason, the Act does not contain express disclaimer rules
for written warranties. 00° The Act does require that the written warranty
100. However, the Act does contain rules regulating disclosure of implied warranties and
remedies. These will be discussed below.
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"fully and conspicuously" disclose all the "terms and conditions of such
warranty," but only to the extent the FTC may require.'"' The FTC requires that the disclosure be in a single document which is "simple and
readily understood."'0 2
The FTC rules require disclosure of a number of specific items which will
inform the consumer of substantial limitations on his rights under the
warranty. Specifically, the warranty must describe and identify thelproduct covered and, "where necessary for clarification," must describe and
identify those products which are excluded from the warranty. 03 Second,
the written warranty must specify which persons can enforce the warranty
if that group is limited to persons other than every consumer-owner during
the period of the warranty. 1 4 Third, the warranty must disclose items or
services for which the warrantor will not pay where such disclosures are
necessary for clarification; all items or services which the warrantor will
provide must be disclosed.0 5 The warranty must also disclose the period
of its duration,'I" the step by step procedure for enforcing the warranty, 0 7
and whether resort to any informal dispute settlement mechanism is required under the terms of the warranty.108 When all of these disclosures
have been made in the requisite simple and readily understood single
document, the consumer will have adequate information concerning the
nature and scope of his warranty. Once consumers understand the terms
of their warranties, it is assumed that competitive pressures of the marketplace will operate to prevent a manufacturer from substantially limiting
the buyer's rights because such a limitation would have to be disclosed.
Unlike the situation with implied warranties, the UCC does not specify
rules for disclaimer of written warranties; however, it does provide rules
of construction. Specifically, negation or limitation of express warranty is
to be construed, wherever reasonable, as consistent with the creation of
express warranty. Where the negation or limitation of an express warranty
could not be construed as reasonable with the creation of the warranty, the
UCC provides that such "negation or limitation is inoperative". 00 Section
2-316:
101. 15 U.S.C.A. §2302(a) (Supp. 1975).
102. 16 C.F.R. §701.3(a) (1975). For a general discussion of the FTC's disclosure requirements, see text accompanying note 18, supra.
103. 16 C.F.R. §701.3(a)(2) (1975).
104. 16 C.F.R. §701.3(a)(1) (1975).
105. 16 C.F.R. §701.3(a)(3) (1975). The proposed rules had required the disclosure of all
duties placed on the consumer. Proposed Rules, §701.3(g) supra note 23, at 29893.
106. 16 C.F.R. §701.3(a)(4) (1975).
107. 16 C.F.R. §701.3(a)(5) (1975).
108. 16 C.F.R. §701.3(a)(6) (1975). Limitations on incidental or consequential damages
must also be disclosed. 16 C.F.R. §701.3(a)(8) (1975).
109. UNIFORM COMMERCL CODE §2-316(1). See §2-317 for further rules of construction.
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[Sleeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language
of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when inconsistent with
language of express warranty . . .,"
Thus, where there is an express warranty which cannot be construed as
consistent with a purported disclaimer of it, the express warranty will
prevail. The Act will apply only to written express warranties and, under
the Act, negation or limitation of such a warranty would have to be in the
written document and could not be made orally by the retail seller.
A warrantor giving an express written warranty covered by the Act will
be bound by these UCC provisions to the extent that they grant to the
consumer greater rights or remedies."' As a result, the warrantor giving a
written warranty will, as a practical matter, find it very difficult to limit
or disclaim obligations created by theftarranty unless the limit or disclaimer is consistent with the obligations created.
Subject t6 two qualifications, neither the Act nor the UCC purport to
establish minimum standards of written warranty protection, except where
a "full" warranty is given. The first qualification concerns minimum requirements for a document called a warranty. As argued above, it is submitted that a document cannot be called a warranty unless it provides the
consumer with some remedy and also complies with disclosure provisions."' Secondly, the UCC does provide that any exclusive or limited
remedy will not be applied where the circumstances cause that remedy to
"fail of its essential purpose. ' " 3 If a transaction is considered a contract
of sale, the drafters of the UCC felt that some "fair quantum" of remedy
should be available for the breach of the obligations of the sales contract.
Beyond this, no standard of warranty protection is required.
B.

Implied Warranties

In contrast to its approach to disclaimer of express warranties, one of the
primary purposes of the Act is to regulate disclaimer of implied warran110.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-316, Comment 1.

111. 15 U.S.C.A. §2311(b)(1) (Supp. 1975).
112. See text accompanying note 33, supra. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(c)(2) (Supp. 1975) provides
that it is deceptive to make "a written warranty created by the use of such terms as 'guaranty'
or 'warranty,' if the terms and conditions of such warranty so limit its scope and application
as to deceive a reasonable individual." See generally Deceptive Advertising of Guaranties,
Guidelines, 16 C.F.R. 239 (1975). These guidelines are still effective to the extent not modified
by rules promulgated under the Act. See Implementation and Enforcement Policy, 719 ATRR
at D-3.
113.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-719(2). Comment 1 to §2-719 states:

However, it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale
within this Article they must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a
fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the
contract.

1134

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

ties." 4 To accomplish this purpose, the Act expressly provides ihat any
warrantor who makes a written warranty will not be permitted to completely disclaim the state law implied warranty."' This requirement applies to both "full" and "limited" written warranties and is a dramatic
change from the UCC. Under the terms of section 2-316 it was possible to
disclaim an implied warranty of merchantability if the disclaimer mentioned merchantability and was conspicuous (if in writing) and it was
possible to disclaim warranties of fitness for a particular purpose if the
disclaimer was in writing and conspicuous."' Alternatively, all implied
warranties could be disclaimed by expressions such as "as is," "with all
faults," or "other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there
is no implied warranty .... ."I This change in the law for all warranties
covered under the Act is based on a policy decision that disclaimers should
not be permitted in the sale of consumer goods. The coverage problems
discussed above permit some consumer warranties to avoid the effects of
this policy decision.
There is one potential interpretation problem in the conclusion reached
in the paragraph above. The implied warranties upon which the Act is
intended to operate are those which arise under state law-usually the
UCC warranties provisions. Yet it can be argued that the implied warranties that come into existence under state law are disclaimed implied warranties under section 2-316, as well as 2-315 and 2-314. The Act creates no
implied warranties and only regulates those created under state law. Yet,
the argument runs, state law does not simply create an unlimited implied
warranty of merchantability (§2-314) or fitness for a particular purpose
(§2-315); state law creates these implied warranties as they are limited by
state law disclaimer provisions (§2-316). The Act regulates not unlimited
state law implied warranties, but rather the limited state law warranties
which arise under the disclaimer provisions of section 2-316 as well as the
warranty creating provisions of sections 2-314 and 2-315. If this argument
is accepted, state law implied warranty disclaimer would be permissible.
This argument is strengthened by the language of section 2-314 which
provides that the warranty of merchantability comes into existence only if
it is not excluded or modified."' It can be argued that this limitation is an
114. See House Committee Report, supra note 2,at 7711; Senate Debate on S. 986, supra
note 6, 117 CONG. REc. at 39818.
115. 15 U.S.C.A. §2308(a) (Supp. 1975). As discussed below, some limitation on these
warranties is permitted.
116. UNIFORM COMMERCIL CODE §2-316(2).
117. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-316(3)(a). Section 2-316(3)(b) deals with disclaimer
of implied warranties by the buyer's examination of the goods or by examination of a sample
or model, and section 2-316(3)(c) deals with disclaimer by course of dealing, course of performance or usage of the trade.
118. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-314(1).
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implicit qualification in the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
The Act sought to remedy this interpretation problem by defining implied
warranty as one "arising under state law (as modified by §§2308 and
2304(a) of this title).""' This language in the statute is supported by the
fact that control of disclaimer of implied warranties was a primary purpose
of the Act.'1 In view of the statutory language and the legislative purpose,
the argument that only a disclaimed implied warranty arises under state
law should be rejected. As is true elsewhere, this problem could have been
avoided by including a definition of at least a minimum standard of implied warranty in the Act.
While the Act does not permit complete disclaimer of implied warranties, it does permit limitations on the duration of an implied warranty
where a "limited" written warranty is given. In this situation, implied
warranties may be limited to the duration of a written warranty if this
period is reasonable and "if such limitation is conscionable and is set forth
in clear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face
of the warranty."' 21 Such a limitation must still comply with the UCC
requirements that it not cause the warranty to fail of its essential purpose.
The requirements of UCC sections 2-316(2) and (3), as discussed above,
would also be applicable to any such limitation to the extent that those
requirements expand the rights or remedies available to a consumer. Thus,
the careful draftsman wishing to limit the duration of his warranty should
comply both with the terms of the Act and with the terms of the UCC.
If the warrantor chooses to make a "full" warranty, he may not limit the
duration of any implied warranty and "may not exclude or limit consequential damages unless such exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the face of the warranty.' ' 22 Some states have enacted legislation
which will prohibit disclaimer of implied warranties in sales of consumer
goods.' 23 Because these statutes afford the consumer greater rights than the
Act, these laws will continue to be effective and in most states will give
the consumer greater protection.
The disclaimer limitations of the Act apply not only to a warrantor, but
also to any "supplier" making a written warranty. A supplier is defined to
include "any person engaged in the business of making a consumer product
directly or indirectly available to consumers. 124 The disclosure limitations
will apply to the typical retailer thus further detering him from giving a
119. 15 U.S.C.A. §2301(7) (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
120. See House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7711; Senate Debate on S. 986, supra
note 6, 117 CONG. REC. at 39818.
121. 15 U.S.C.A. §2308(b) (Supp. 1975); 16 CFR §701.3(a)(7) (1975).
122. 15 U.S.C.A. §2304(a) (Supp. 1975).
123. See note 39 supra. It appears that at least one state, Kansas, has used such a
prohibition as a substitute for strict liability in tort in products liability cases. Clark and
Davis, supra note 2, at 597-605.
124. 15 U.S.C.A. §2301(4) (Supp. 1975).
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written warranty. In addition, the usual consumer suit must separate
claims for breach of the implied warranty from claims for breach of the
disclaimer provisions of the Act.' 25 This complexity is caused in part by the
Act's coverage of the typical retailer's implied warranties in the remedies
provisions but not in its regulation of implied warranty disclosure.
The consequences of a purported disclaimer which does not comply with
the provisions of the Act are serious. First, the disclaimer is ineffective,
both for purposes of the chapter and for purposes of state law.'", The Act
provides that it is a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act to fail to comply with a requirement imposed by the Act or to violate
any of its prohibitions. 2 1 In its enforcement guidelines, the FTC stated:
Use of express limitations or exclusions which are unenforceable will be
viewed by the Commission as deceptive under section 110(c) of the Act
28
or under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.'
In such a situation, the Act authorizes an action to restrain such conduct'2 9
and the full enforcement powers of the FTC, including civil penalties,
would be available.
IV.
A.

REMEDIES

Warranty Limitations On Consumer Remedies

The sophisticated warrantor who wishes to minimize his liabilities to
consumers may be able to achieve this with remedy limitations even
though such a result would be otherwise prohibited either by limitations
on disclaimer of warranties or by competitive pressure in giving warranties.
For this reason, it is necessary to examine what limitations of consumer
remedies are permissible under the Act and the UCC to determine what
minimum standards of protection the consumer is actually guaranteed.
125. In the fact situation presented, the following claims are possible under the Act. First,
against the manufacturer: (1) a claim for breach of the provisions of the written warranty,
(2) a claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and (3) a claim for breach of
the disclaimer regulations of the Act. Where the retailer does not give a written warranty the
claims against the retailer under the Act are as follows: (1) a claim for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability, and (2) a claim for breach of the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. Ifthe retailer gives a written warranty, there are also potential claims
for (1) breach of the written warranty, and (2) breach of the disclaimer provisions of the Act.
In addition, there is a potential claim against the manufacturer or the retailer or both for
breach of expressed nonwritten warranties; this claim must be pursued under the UCC and
is not covered by the Act. In addition, the consumer might raise in defense the UCC objections to disclaimers which are permissible under the Act.
126. 15 U.S.C.A. §2308(c) (Supp. 1975).
127. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(b) (Supp. 1975).
128. FTC Implementation and Enforcement Policy, 719 ATRR at D-2.
129. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(c)(1) (Supp. 1975).
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Under the terms of the Act, a warrantor giving a "full" warranty must
"remedy" the consumer product, and it can also be argued that some
minimum standard of performance will be required even of a partial warrantor.' The term "remedy" is defined to require repair, replacement, or
refund, although there are some restrictions on when the warrantor may
insist upon a refund.!"1
The Act does not require a minimum level of compensation for persons
incurring consequential damages for personal injury as a result of warranty
breach. A "full" warrantor is permitted to exclude or limit such consequential damages if the exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the
face of the warranty.'32 The final rules also require disclosure of exclusions
or limitations on relief "such as incidental or consequential damages," and
have a prescribed statement which must be included in such a limitation. 33 Beyond this, the Act does not prohibit such limitations. It specifies
that it is not intended to (1) impose liability on any person for personal
injury, (2) affect the liability of any person for personal injury, or (3)
supersede any state law regarding consequential damages for personal injury.' Thus, any limitation on the warrantor's power to exclude or limit
incidental or consequential damages must arise from the UCC, and any
such limitation contained in the UCC will be effective.
The UCC does provide that "[l]imitation of consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie uncons3 5
cionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not."'
Otherwise, the UCC normally permits remedy limitations and allows the
parties to make those remedies exclusive. 36' Therefore, a warrantor must
be concerned with three different types of incidental or consequential damages limitations. First, the warrantor will probably not be permitted to
exclude or limit consequential damages for personal injury as this is prima
facie unconscionable. Second, a warrantor may be permitted to limit or
exclude nonpersonal injury consequential damages, such as consequential
130. See 15 U.S.C.A. §2304(a)(1) (Supp. 1975) for full warranties. A partial warranty is
deceptive if the terms and conditions of such warranty so limit its scope and application as
to deceive reasonable individuals. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(c)(2) (Supp. 1975). See note 112 supra.
Presumably a reasonable individual will believe that some meaningful compensation for
warranty violations is available as a remedy.
131. 15 U.S.C.A. §2301(10) (Supp. 1975).
132. 15 U.S.C.A. §2304(a)(3) (Supp. 1975). The FTC has interpreted the Act to require
the same conspicuous disclosures for limited warranties as are required in the case of full
warranties. FTC Implementation and Enforcement Policy, 719 ATRR at D-2. This interpretation was issued before the final rules.
133. 16 C.F.R. §701(3)(a)(8) (1975). The prescribed statement is: "Some states do not
allow the exclusion or limitation of incidental or consequential damages, so the above limitation or exclusion may not apply to you."
134. 15 U.S.C.A. §2311(b)(2) (Supp. 1975). See Conference Report, supra note 8, at 7760.
135. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-719(3). This point is discussed in Leete, supra note 2,
at 373.
136. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§2-719(1) and (2).
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damages for economic loss.' 37 However, the UCC clearly contemplates that
the general unconscionability provisions of UCC §2-302 will apply to the
question of warranty limitation.'38 Thus, a limitation or exclusion of economic consequential damages might be impermissible if it was held to be
unconscionable under the general unconscionability section. Third, the
warrantor can exclude or limit incidental damages, again subject to the
operation of the general unconscionability section of the UCC.' 9 It has
been suggested that, to the extent that a warrantor is still permitted to
limit or exclude any incidental or consequential damages, this problem
should be resolved by state law prohibitions.'10
The Act does not prohibit shortening of the period of limitations during
which an action for breach of warranty can be brought. However, the more
protective provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code would apply and
the period of limitations could not be shortened to less than one year."'
B.

Informal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

The policy of Congress, the Act declares, is to encourage the creation and
use of informal dispute settlement mechanisms to decide consumer disputes.' To accomplish this policy, Congress has provided that resort to
such a mechanism can be required of a consumer if this requirement is
stated in the written warranty and if the mechanism meets the requirements of the rules authorized to be promulgated under the Act. " The rules
require disclosure of certain specific information concerning the mechanism on the face of the written warranty and specify that the warrantor is
not to incorporate into the terms of a written warranty required resort to
a mechanism that fails to comply with the requirements of the rules. ' The
137. Clark and Davis, supra note 2, at 611-12. This is true, even though the warrantor
gives a written warranty and would not be permitted to disclaim implied warranties in this
situation.
138. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-302, Comment 1. This comment uses disclaimer of
implied warranties as an example of a potentially unconscionable provision.
139. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-715 where the distinction between incidental and
consequential damages is explained.
140. Clark and Davis, supra note 2 at 613, 616.
141. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-725(1). Clark and Davis, supra note 2 at 611, question
whether the UCC limitation would apply as being more protective of the consumer's rights,
since the warranties could have been disclaimed. For a discussion of why the courts should
not interpret the term implied warranty to mean disclaimed implied warranties, see text
accompanying notes 119 and 120, supra.
The Act does permit limitations on the duration of a written warranty, if they are disclosed,
15 U.S.C.A. §2302(b)(2) (Supp. 1975), except where the consumer has been deprived of the
use of the goods due to repairs for an extended time during the warranty time period, 15
U.S.C.A. §2302(b)(3) (Supp. 1975). For the disclosure rules, see 16 C.F.R. §701.3(a)(4) (1975).
142. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(a)(1) (Supp. 1975).
143. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(a)(3) (Supp. 1975).
144. 16 C.F.R. §§703.2(b) and 703.2(a) (1975), respectively. The rules in 16 C.F.R. §703
(1975), govern the details of creation and operation of an approved informal dispute settle-
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primary value of such a mechanism, other than settlement of consumer
disputes, is to defuse a class action. If a mechanism does exist and resort
to it is required, then the named plaintiffs in a class action must resort to
the mechanism before pursuing their class claims beyond a court determination of their representative capacity."' Thus, the warrantor will have the
opportunity to attempt amicable settlements with individual class
representatives before the action has proceeded to litigation on the merits.
Where submission of consumer dispute is required by the terms of the
warranty, the mechanism's decision is not binding, but "any decision in
such procedure shall be admissible in evidence."' 46 This is obviously an
attempt to encourage parties to abide by the decision of the dispute settlement mechanism. Because there is no presumption or other procedural
status accorded the decision of the dispute settlement mechanism, no
procedural problems are encountered in evaluating this evidence. However, it is difficult to weigh the probative value of such evidence. Admission of the evidence will encourage parties to relitigate the composition and
impartiality of the dispute settlement mechanism as well as the result
actually obtained.
Under the Act, the FTC has the power to review the bona fide operation
of any dispute settlement mechanism to which resort is required. This,
combined with the detailed rules for the operation of such a mechanism
which the FTC has issued, gives it substantial regulatory power over the
operation of such a mechanism.
Warrantors who establish informal dispute settlement mechanisms
under the Act receive some protection from consumer suits and class actions. However, these protections are substantially weakened by the coverage of this section of the Act. The consumer is required to submit disputes
"only when pursuing rights or remedies newly created by Section 110(d),
such as the class action under Section 110(d)(3), attorney fees, under Section 110(d)(2), or, by reference, any right or remedy newly created by Title
1 of the Act . . . ."' If the consumer wishes to pursue other remedies,
such as those granted by the UCC or other state law, he would not be
required to submit the matter to the dispute settlement mechanism. Consequently, the warrantor is not assured that all disputes will be channeled
through the mechanism before litigation. This certainly decreases the attractiveness of establishing a mechanism to the warrantor. However, if the
ment mechanism. The basic policy of these rules is to make the mechanism operate fairly.
The internal operation of such a mechanism will not be covered here.
145. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(a)(3) (Supp. 1975). It should be noted that the statute does not
require that such class representative obtain a court determination of their representative
capacity before resorting to the mechanism. Presumably this is a question to be settled
between the individuals involved and the mechanism.
146. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(a)(3) (Supp. 1975).
147. 40 Fed. Reg. 60191 (Dec. 31, 1975). See 15 U.S.C.A. §§2310(a)(3) and 2310(d) (Supp.
1975).
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warrantor's primary reason for establishing the mechanism is to defuse a
class action, the mechanism may serve the warrantor's purposes. It is quite
likely that the only kind of federal consumer class action which can be
brought is the one authorized in Section 110(d) of the statute and hence,
it would be subject to submission."8 Of course, this would not protect the
warrantor against a state class action based upon state law and seeking
remedies other than those provided in the Act.
C.

Right Of Action And Remedies In The Consumer Suit

The Act authorizes a federal cause of action for breach of the obligations
arising under the Act, subject to one condition.' In such a suit, the warrantor must be offered the opportunity to cure the defect unless the dispute
is required to be submitted to an informal dispute settlement mechanism.1 0 A class action may proceed, prior to this opportunity to cure, only
"to the extent the court determines necessary to establish the representative capacity of the named plaintiffs . . . ."I" Where a class action is
contemplated, the opportunity to cure is to be afforded by the named
plaintiffs and they are to notify the warrantor that they are acting on
behalf of the class. Although the Act does not specify, presumably the
plaintiffs would be entitled to insist on enforcing the rights of all class
members, rather than simply to pursue their individual claims. To do
otherwise would permit the warrantor to accommodate the52 claims of the
named plaintiffs without resolving the claims of the class.
The Act authorizes suit against a supplier or warrantor for breach of any
written warranty or implied warranty obligation, or any of its requirements. 53 Such a suit may be brought in the court of any state of competent
jurisdiction or in the District of Columbia. In addition, a non-class action
suit may be brought in the federal district courts if the amount in controversy in any individual claim is greater than $25.00 and if the amount in
controversy on all claims is greater than $50,000.? 5 While the statute is not
particularly clear on this requirement, the legislative history makes clear
148. See text accompanying notes 162 and 163 infra.
149. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(d) (Supp. 1975).
150. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(e) (Supp. 1975). "The provisions of subsection e [2310(e)] would
be inapplicable in any case in which the consumer has initially resorted to an informal dispute
settlement procedure prescribed in the warranty." House Committee Report, supra note 2,
at 7725. Presumably, the draftsmen considered the right to require resort to a dispute settlement mechanism to be equivalent to the right to cure.
151. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(a)(3) (Supp. 1975).
152. If suit has not been filed and no judicial determination of the representative capacity
of the plaintiffs has been made, then presumably approval and notice would not be required
before the amicable settlement of claims by the class members. Certainly if suit has been
filed, such approval and notice will be necessary. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
153. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(b)(1) (1975 Supp.). Clark and Davis, supra note 2, at 615-16, refer
to this as "muscling up," the consumer's implied warranties.
154. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310 (Supp. 1975).
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that it was the intent of Congress to impose both of these requirements on
any federal court non-class action suit.'55 Since the Act is a statute regulating trade or commerce, these jurisdictional limitations are constitutional. 5 ' It will be a rare consumer non-class action suit which will meet
these requirements. In order to aggregate $50,000 worth of consumer complaints, the action would require a great many named plaintiffs. Yet it will
be difficult for such a group to form without the information disclosure
which modern discovery would require after suit is filed. Potential plain.
tiffs will not know of each other so no single individual can contact the
others to form such a group. Of course, if the amount in controversy is in
excess of $10,000 for a particular claim, the plaintiff could proceed under
the general federal question jurisdiction statute. 157 It seems extremely unlikely that such a consumer complaint will arise. Thus, federal jurisdiction
over a non-class suit brought under the Act is unlikely.
It is equally unlikely that the requirements of federal court jurisdiction
for class actions will be met under the Act. In order to bring a class action,
the two requirements specified above must be met; it will be as difficult
to meet these requirements in a class action as in the non-class suit discussed above. In class actions, the additional requirement that there be
more than 100 named plaintiffs is imposed.'5 The requirement of 100
named plaintiffs is an unusual one and will be difficult to meet. This is
particularly true in view of the opportunity to defuse the class action which
a warrantor has either under a qualifying dispute settlement mechanism
or under the cure provisions discussed above. As stated by Congress,
"[tihe purpose of these jurisdictional provisions is to avoid trivial or
insignificant actions being brought as class actions in the federal courts.' 59
In making it virtually impossible to bring a federal court class action under
the provisions of the Act, this purpose appears to have been accomplished
with a vengeance. Presumably, Congress intended that most of the class
actions brought under the Act would be brought in state court. This assumes that the state courts afford the same or similar opportunities to
bring a class action which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure afford.
Such an assumption is not necessarily well founded. 6 " Clearly, if the Act
155. This interpretation of the Act to require that both conditions be met in an individual
suit is clearly supported by the legislative history. House Committee Report, supra note 2,
at 7723-24. The statute is difficult to interpret because the section is stated in the disjunctive,
but the disjunctive requirements are negative ones.
156. This is a statute regulating commerce, so jurisdiction is to be determined under 28
U.S.C.A. §1337. House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7724. The additional jurisdictional limits of the Act are constitutional. 1 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE .06[.83] at 624 (1975). The Senate version of the Act had used the general federal question jurisdictional limits of 28 U.S.C.A. §1331 (Rev. 1966). Senate Committee Reports, supra at note 3,
at 23.
157. 28 U.S.C.A. §1331 (Rev. 1966).
158. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(d)(3)(C) (Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
159. House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7724.
160. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §81A-123 (Rev. 1972). This section enacts federal Rule 23
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is designed to permit consumers new remedies, it should do so directly,
rather than through the assumption about state law. To the extent that
the Act was designed to encourage consumer class actions,"' it clearly has
not achieved this purpose. If the class qualifies, a class action could be
brought to enforce the Act under the general federal question jurisdictional
statute. In order to bring a class action under this statute it would be
necessary, under recent Supreme Court decisions, for each member of the
class to have a $10,000 claim and for the class to bear the burden of notice
to all members.' The typical consumer claim is considerably less than
$10,000 and few consumer class plaintiffs can afford to invest large sums
in giving notice to what will probably be a large number of class members.
Thus, these requirements are much too strict to provide this as a meaningful remedy to consumers.
The Act does not change the strict notice requirements placed on class
plaintiffs by the recent Supreme Court case of Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelyn."3 Discussing the notice problem, the House Committee reporting on the Act stressed its remedial nature and asked the courts not to use
notice requirements to frustrate the purposes of the Act: "[T]he particular circumstances of the plaintiff or plaintiffs should be carefully evaluated
by the court, including the question of whether the financial burden of
such identification and notification would be likely to deny them relief."', 4
This argument is, however, addressed to the reasonable notice requirements of Eisen and is not an attempt to change that requirement. In view
of the class action requirements discussed immediately above, and in view
of the notice requirements which the courts have placed on class action
plaintiffs, it must be concluded that the implicit promise of a federal court
as it was written prior to the 1966 Amendments. Under the older federal Rule 23, a consumer
class action would typically have been a "spurious" one in which several rights are sought to
be enforced, there are common questions of law and fact, and a common relief is sought.
Georgia appears to limit a class action to enforce several rights to situations where "the object
of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property involved
in the action." GA. CODE ANN. §81A-123(a)(2) (Rev. 1972). See 2 H. KOOMAN, FEDERAL CIVIL
PRACTICE, §23-1 at 69 (Rev. 1969).
161. See House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7723; House Debate, supra note 22,
120 CONG. REC. at 9407. In a separate statement, several members of the House Committee
disagreed with the class action provisions. The basis of the disagreement was that since 1966,
no single consumer class action has been tried and decided on the merits. Lack of promptness
makes the class action an unrealistic remedy for the typical consumer. "Thus, while we
continue to question the effectiveness of class actions as a viable remedy for breach of warranty, we feel that we have, in this legislation, done little to encourage them .... " House
Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7754. In view of the restrictions discussed in the text,
this statement certainly appears to be correct.
162. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L. Ed.2d 732 (1974);
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L. Ed.2d 511 (1973); Snyder
v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969). See Schuck and Cohen, The
Consumer Class Action: An Endangered Species, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39 (1974).
163. 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974).
164. House Committee Report, supra note 2, at 7724.
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class action is not a particularly meaningful one for most consumer purchasers.
Where a consumer does qualify for federal court jurisdiction under the
provisions discussed above, or where a state court action is brought as
authorized by the Act, the consumer is entitled to recover court costs and
attorney's fees, with the attorney's fees based on time expended rather
than the amount of recovery secured. 6 5 This method of measuring attorney
fees is intended to make consumer actions economically feasible for attorneys even if the amount in question is not large. This remedy is available
in the discretion of the court. As demonstrated above, it is quite likely that
most consumer enforcement actions under the Act will be brought in state
court and, in view of the fact that most state courts are not accustomed to
awarding attorney's fees, this remedy of the Act is open to question. For
the consumer who wishes to assert warranty rights arising under state law
or another federal statute and who does not base his cause of action on the
Act, these remedies are not available. 6 '
In a consumer action based on the Act, or in a dispute prior to institution
of a legal action, all state law provisions which afford the consumer greater
remedy than are afforded under the Act are also applicable. 67 Typically,
these will be the UCC buyer's remedies. In the consumer situation, a buyer
is most likely to resort to the remedies provided under sections 2-714, 2715, and 2-717. (Of course, these remedies are available only where the
warranty does not limit available remedies, or where such limitation is not
permissible.) Under section 2-714, the "usual standard and reasonable
method of ascertaining damages" for a breach of warranty is the difference
in value between the goods as accepted and the value they would have had
if they had been as warranted. 8 This section also authorizes recovery of
incidental and consequential damages, as provided by section 2-715. The
typical consumer may have a cause of action for damages under section 2715(1) and, if not limited, consequential damages under section 2715(2)(b). In addition, if the buyer gives notice to the seller, he may deduct
from the price all or any part of his damages resulting from the breach of
contract under section 2-717. This last remedy will be practically available
only to the credit buyer; in view of the FTC's recent abolition of the holder
in due course doctrine in consumer transactions, this remedy is a much
more meaningful one. 6' The other UCC buyer's remedies are: (1) cover, (2)
market price damages for non-delivery or repudiation, and (3) specific
165. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(d)(2) (Supp. 1975). Of course such an action is permitted as the
Act is not to be the exclusive remedy.
166. FTC Implementation and Enforcement Policy, 719 ATRR at D-3.
167. 15 U.S.C.A. §2311(b)(1) (Supp. 1975).
168. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-714, Comment 2. Of course, this remedy is not exclusive.
169. 16 C.F.R. §433 et seq. (1975); 739 ATRR D-1 (BNA 1975) (issued November 14, 1975;
effective May 14, 1976).
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performance or replevin. These are potentially available to the consumer
buyer although they are, practically, less likely to be meaningful remedies
to him. 70
The FTC is also authorized by the Act to sue in federal district court to
restrain deceptive warranties or any other failure to comply with the Act.' 7 '
In such a suit, a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction is
authorized where the court finds it appropriate by weighing the equities,
considering the likelihood of ultimate success, and considering the public
interest. However, the Commission apparently is only authorized to enforce the Act and would not be empowered to restrain a violation of UCC
warranty provisions except as they are adopted in the Act. In addition,
Title II of the Act authorizes the FTC to sue for equitable relief on behalf
of the consumer. 7 ' While an extended discussion is beyond the scope of this
article, it should be noted that this provision perhaps compensates for the
weakness of the class action provisions of the Act. Even though the typical
consumer may not be able to bring his own class action, the FTC can
pursue individual or group remedies for him.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Act was intended to give the consumer a better understanding of
the warranties on the things he purchases and to require a certain minimum level of implied warranty performance. In the usual sale on consumer
goods, the Act's coverage will tend to accomplish these purposes. However,
there are many instances where problems develop with the coverage of the
Act because it is not identical to the coverage of implied warranties created
under the UCC. These coverage problems can best be solved by amending
the Act to create its own implied warranties, perhaps supplemented by
state law implied warranties. A second possible solution, although a less
desirable one, is to amend the Act to make its coverage synonomous with
that of the law of the state where it is being enforced. Typically, this will
be the UCC, and where there are state variations in the UCC or other state
laws, this would cause a warrantor great difficulty in planning national
warranties to comply with different local coverages. Overall, the Act
170. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-712 provides for the buyer to cover when there has
been a rejection or revocation of acceptance. Here, a revocation of acceptance (UCC §2-608)
is possible but not likely. A rejection (UCC §§2-601, -606) is possible. Damages awarded
would only be the cost of cover, less the contract price, plus incidental and consequential
damages. UCC §2-713 applies to measure damages where there has been nondelivery or
repudiation. This is less likely to happen in a consumer situation although there might be a
repudiation which arises after rejection or after a number of attempted repairs. UCC §2-716
covers specific performance or replevin. In view of the fungibility of most consumer goods,
this remedy is not likely to be particularly helpful to the consumer.
171. 15 U.S.C.A. §2310(c)(1) (Supp. 1975).
172. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, §205, 15
U.S.C.A. §45(m)(1)(a) (Supp. 1975). See authorities cited, supra note 1.
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should be changed to work more harmoniously with the UCC wherever a
combination of state and federal regulation is deemed desirable.
The Act's attempt to create a federal cause of action for breach of most
consumer warranties is successful, but its promise that such an action can
be brought in federal court is largely illusory. Thus, the new remedies
envisioned in the Act must be pursued in state courts which are, for the
most part, unaccustomed to granting many of them. For this reason there
is a very real question with the practical availability of these remedies.
The consumer needs increased regulation of warranties on the products
he buys. As a first step in meeting this need the Act is commendable. Its
theory is to use the market mechanism, through required disclosure, to
encourage better warranty protection and, consequently, better product
reliability. However, there are additional steps which remain to be taken
before the consumer's needs will be fully protected.

